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The Right to Counsel at Summary Courts-Martial:
COMA at the Crossroads
In deciding United States v. Redmond1 the United States Court of
Military Appeals (COMA) will make a major determination concerning the
right to counsel at summary courts-martial. Not only will this decision
clarify the position of the summary court-martial in the military justice
system, 2 it will also indicate COMA's perception of its own role in that
system. This note will examine the options available to COMA and
recommend a course of action for it to follow.
UNITED STATES V. ALDERMAN: RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT
SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL

In 1973 the Court of Military Appeals held, in United States v.
Alderman,s that unless an accused had been represented by counsel at a
summary court-martial which resulted in conviction and confinement,
evidence of his conviction was inadmissible at a subsequent special courtmartial for the purpose of consideration in sentencing.4 In March 1976 the
'No. NCM 76-0006 (U.S. Navy C.M.R. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 32,049 (C.M.A.
March 30, 1976).
2
The constitutional position of the summary court-martial was drastically altered by a
recent Supreme Court decision which held that summary courts-martial are not criminal
prosecutions within the meaning of the sixth amendment. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25
(1976). Summary courts-martial are provided for by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970). The jurisdiction of summary courts-martial is limited
to enlisted personnel. The sentence which may be imposed is limited to one month's
confinement, forty-five days' hard labor without confinement, two months' restriction, or
forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay. An accused may, by statute, refuse trial by
summary court. In that event, charges will be either dropped or referred to a special or general
court-martial. Id.
3
United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). Judge Quinn, for the
majority, carefully limited the holding to the "admissibility of evidence of a previous
conviction obtained at a trial at which the accused was improperly denied the right to
counsel." 22 C.M.A. at 302, 46 C.M.R. at 302. He noted that although the decision was based
on the.precept of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), that a sentence to imprisonment
for even a brief period of time without representation by counsel was invalid, Alderman
presented a narrower question than did Argersinger. Judge Duncan, concurring and
dissenting, would have expanded the holding of Alderman to preclude the use of all summary
court-martial convictions, since excluding only those at which confinement had been imposed
would produce a "bizarre result." 22 C.M.A. at 303-06, 46 C.M.R. at 303-06. In response to
the Argersinger and Alderman decisions, the Navy and the Army promulgated regulations
requiring counsel at summary courts-martial before confinement could be imposed. SECNAV
082237Z152, June 8, 1973; D.A. Msg P101203Z, July 10, 1972. The Air Force changed its
regulations to require counsel at all summary courts-martial. A.F. Military Justice Guide, A.F.
T 3-6c, July 2, 1973.
Man. 111-1,
4
The maximum punishment that can normally be imposed at a special court-martial is
six months' confinement, three months' hard labor without confinement, or partial forfeiture
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United States Supreme Court, in Middendorf v. Henry,5 held that the sixth
amendment did not mandate a right to counsel at summary courts-martial,
nor did the due process clause of the fifth amendment require the provision
of counsel,6 in light of congressional intent and military necessity.'
COMA must now reappraise its decision in A lderman8 in the context of
the Supreme Court's decision in Middendorf.9 In facing the same issue in
the pending Redmond 0 case as it did in Alderman," COMA has several
choices open to it: it may overrule Alderman; it may modify Alderman in
the context of Middendorf, taking into account the collateral effects which
2
summary court-martial convictions have in other areas of military law;' or
3
as part of its continuing review of the military justice system,' it may
of pay for six months. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970). An escalator clause, however,
provides that a bad-conduct discharge may be adjudged on proof of two or more convictions
127c (Table of Maximum
within the previous three years. Manual for Courts-Martial
Punishments, Section B), United States, 1969 (rev.) [hereinafter cited as MCM].
Alderman had only two prior convictions-one by summary court-martial and one by
special court-martial. While UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970), provided the accused the
right to counsel at the prior special court-martial, no such right existed with respect to the
prior summary court-martial. Since Alderman received the bad-conduct discharge at the
special court-martial proceedings from which he appealed, the inference was clear that his
prior summary court-martial conviction had activated the escalator clause of MCM 1127c,
1969 (rev.).
SMiddendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976), rev'g Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th
Cir. 1974). The suit was originally brought in federal court by enlisted members of the Marine
Corps as a class action for habeas corpus relief, challenging military authority to try them at
summary courts-martial without providing counsel. 357 F. Supp. 495 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
6Where there is a right to counsel in the military, it is provided without regard to
indigency.
UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970).
7
By accepting without examination the Navy's argument that military necessity
required that a summary court-martial be a brief disciplinary hearing, and then assuming that
military necessity was the reason for congressional failure to provide for counsel at summary
courts-martial, the Supreme Court has created the anomaly of Congress being the final arbiter
of constitutional questions for the military. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion also
suggests that budgetary concerns are at the heart of the argument, thus equating money with
military necessity. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 45 (1976). The military necessity
rationale is undercut by the accused's right to refuse trial by summary court-martial, see note 2
supra, since counsel would be provided under UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970) at a special
or general court-martial. 425 U.S. at 71 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
822 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
9425 U.S. 25 (1976).
"0No. 32,049 (C.M.A. March 30, 1976). Redmond was convicted by a special courtmartial at which the military judge had received evidence of two prior counsel-less convictions
at summary court-martial and one imposition of nonjudicial punishment under UCMJ art.
15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970). On appeal Redmond has challenged the validity of his sentence.
"There is no direct review of summary courts-martial since they may not impose
punitive discharges or confinement for more than one year. UCMJ arts. 66(b), 67(b), 10 U.S.C.
§§ 866(b), 867(b) (1970). In addition to the question which was certified to COMA by the Navy
Judge Advocate General pursuant to art. 67(b) (2) concerning Alderman's continued validity,
COMA itself ordered briefs in the Redmond case on the additional question whether "the intro-

duction of counsel-less non-criminal adjudications of guilt or culpability in a criminal trial by
court-martial
is permissible." C.M.A. Daily Journal, No. 76-72 (April 14, 1976).
2

' The Supreme Court's Middendorf opinion did not consider this issue at any length,
which indicates that the Court may not have had sufficient information on which to base a
judgment. See 425 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1976).
"sSee notes 64-91 infra & text accompanying.
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expand the holding in Alderman to include a right to counsel at all
14
summary courts-martial.
Overruling Alderman
COMA may simply overrule Alderman and declare that convictions
obtained at summary courts-martial without counsel are valid. It would be
unfortunate if COMA chose this course of action. While the Supreme
Court's decision in Middendorf deserves consideration,' 5 there are several
reasons why it should not be necessarily controlling. First, the issues
presented in Redmond differ from those in Middendorf.t 6 Middendorf was
concerned with the validity of a counsel-less conviction at a summary
court-martial; the Supreme Court did not seriously consider the collateral
effects of such a conviction at subsequent special or general courtsmartial.' 7 In addition to the effects of such convictions within the courtmartial system, the consequences of these convictions follow the enlisted
serviceman throughout his military career and extend into civilian life. A
record of summary court-martial convictions may affect chances of military
promotion," contribute to a bad-conduct discharge at a subsequent special
court-martial, 9 trigger an administrative discharge from the service, 20 and
keep a former serviceman from obtaining a job in civilian life.2' In view of
"Since the Supreme Court, in Middendorf, has rejected confinement as triggeripg the
right to counsel, see 425 U.S. 25, 56 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), COMA may now make a
decision free of the conceptual difficulties which Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972),
caused the court in Alderman. See note 3 supra.
"5The Court of Military Appeals has consistently held that it follows Supreme Court
decisions. E.g., United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 299, 46 C.M.R. 298, 299 (1973);
United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 641, 37 C.M.R. 249, 261 (1967). However, these
statements have always followed an expansive construction of constitutional rights by the
Supreme Court. In Middendorf the Supreme Court took a restrictive view of the applicability
of the Bill of Rights to the military. See Willis, The Constitution, the United States Court of
Military Appeals and the Future, 57 MIL. L. REV. 27, 67 (1972).
"6See notes 5, 10-11 supra. Plaintiffs in Middendorf were challenging their convictions at
summary courts-martial without counsel and made no claim of any future consequences. In
addition, the Supreme Court did not receive sufficient information on which to base a
judgment on collateral effects. The Government, for example, claimed that the collateral
effects of summary courts-martial were minimal but cited little authority for its assertion. Brief
for Federal Parties at 39-40, Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
' 7See notes 33-63 infra & text accompanying.
"8Hearings on S. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,87th Cong., 2d Sess. 838 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings]:
"A NCO may survive one summary court-martial without reduction being effected, but it is
unlikely that, with one conviction on his record, he will survive a second trial and retain his
status."
19MCM
127c, 1969 (rev.). See note 4 supra.
20A summary court-martial can be used to justify an undesirable or general discharge for
"frequent involvement of a discreditable nature with civil and military authorities." Dept. of
Defense Directive 1332.14, VII, I, 1. See Jones, The Gravity of AdministrativeDischarges:A
Legal and EmpiricalEvaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973); Comment, Punishment of Enlisted
Personnel Outside the UCMJ: A Statutory and Equal Protection Analysis of Military
Discharge Certificates, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227 (1974).
21See 1962 Hearings, supra note 18, at 838. The discharges to which summary courtsmartial contribute also affect civilian employment. According to former Chief Judge Quinn,
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the results that flow from such convictions, it is difficult to accept the
statement of the Court in Middendorf that summary court-martial convictions "have no consequences for the accused beyond the immediate
punishment meted out . .. *"22
Second, the Court of Military Appeals has expertise in military law and
the military system in general, while the Supreme Court does not. 23 COMA
has dealt with the claim of military necessity frequently, 24 understands it
thoroughly, and, as a result, employs a balancing test which requires the
proponent of the claim to bear the burden of persuasion before rights of the
accused are swept aside. 25 COMA, by virtue of its knowledge of the
military justice system as a whole, is able to view the effects of a summary
court-martial from the newly modified perspective of a noncriminal
civilian employers "will not give work to a man with an undesirable discharge. It is a very
severe penalty." Id. at 188. Many civilian courts have recognized that any discharge less than
honorable stigmatizes the former serviceman. E.g., Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970); Glidden v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1966); Sofranoff v. United States, 165 Ct.
Cl. 470 (1964). See Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges:A Legal and Empirical
Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. 1, 15 & n.72 (1973); Brown, The Results of Punitive Discharge,
1961 JAG J. 13; Comment, Punishment of Enlisted PersonnelOutside the UCMJ: A Statutory
and Equal Protection Analysis of Military Discharge Certificates,9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
227, 272 (1974).
22425 U.S. 25, 39 (1976).
23
At least one Justice did not even know what a summary court-martial was and
confused the military justice system of World War II with the current Uniform Code of
Military Justice. Oral argument before the Supreme Court 7-12, Middendorf v. Henry, Nos.
74-175, 74-5176, Jan. 22, 1975. The Court did not understand the difference between
confinement on the one hand and restriction and correctional custody on the other. Id. at 7-8.
COMA has dealt at some length with these distinctions. E.g., United States v. Alderman, 22
C.M.A. 298, 301-02, 46 C.M.R. 298, 301-02 (1973) (restriction); United States v. Shamel, 22
a
C.M.A.24 361, 362, 47 C.M.R. 116, 117 (1973) (correctional custody).
E.g., United States v. Young, 24 C.M.A. 275, 51 C.M.R. 791 (1976) (military necessity
justifies regulations governing hair length and style); United States v. Wolzok, 23 C.M.A. 492,
494, 50 C.M.R. 572, 574 (1975) (a crowded docket, evidence of a manpower shortage,
insufficient reason for failure to comply with speedy trial rule); United States v. Quinones, 23
C.M.A. 457, 461, 50 C.M.R. 476, 480 (1975) (denial of accused's request for individual military
counsel unsupported by claim of work week in excess of forty hours); United States v.
Johnson, 22 C.M.A. 524, 48 C.M.R. 9 (1974) (claim of inadequate personnel, administrative
convenience no excuse for failure to afford accused speedy trial). The issue of military
necessity was found not persuasive in Alderman, in part because the Army and Air Force had
voluntarily complied with Argersinger at summary courts-martial. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. at
303, 46
C.M.R. at 303.
25
"[T]he burden of showing that military conditions require a different rule than that
prevailing in the civilian community is upon the party arguing for a different rule." Courtney
v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 89, 51 C.M.R. 260, 262 (1976); "[W]e have recognized the need for
balancing the application of the constitutional protection against military needs." United
States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 307, 46 C.M.R. 298, 307 (1972) (Darden, J., dissenting,
arguing that military necessity precluded application of Argersinger). Other cases in which
COMA has balanced military necessity against individual rights include United States v.
Smith, 23 C.M.A. 542, 50 C.M.R. 713 (1975); United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R.
338 (1972); United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States v.
Wilson, 12 C.M.A. 165, 30 C.M.R. 165 (1961); United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 29
C.M.R. 244 (1960); United States v. Nation, 9 C.M.A. 724, 26 C.M.R. 504 (1958); United States
v. Hilldebrandt, 8 C.M.A. 635, 25 C.M.R. 139 (1958).
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characterization of summary courts 26 and to deal with such effects in this
new context. Because of the conceptual problems which a noncriminal
adjudication of guilt presents, 27 COMA would be well-advised to deal with
28
the practical problems that will arise within the military justice system.
In contrast, the Supreme Court-because of its already crowded docket and
the necessity to rely almost exclusively upon the parties to a case for its
information on military justice-is ill-equipped to engage in this type of
ongoing analysis.
Finally, the Supreme Court has given great deference in the past to
judgments of the Court of Military Appeals. 29 COMA has been called the
"Supreme Court" of the military3 0 and is in a unique position to supervise
the court-martial system as a whole. With its extensive knowledge of
military law, and with the ruling in Middendorf that confinement is
irrelevant, 3 ' COMA now has the opportunity to clear the theoretical
muddle3 2 of Alderman that prevented the Supreme Court from drawing on
COMA for guidance.

26
See
27

note 2 supra.
Compare Brief for Appellant at 4-5 with Brief for American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation and National Military Discharge Review Project as Amicus Curiae at 6-7, United
States v. Redmond, No. 32,049 (C.M.A. March 30, 1976). Appellant argues that a summary
court-martial is criminal in all respects save that of the right to counsel, while the Amicus
Curiae contends that the Middendorf characterization of summary courts-martial as noncriminal
applies to all aspects of the proceeding.
28
See notes 33-63 infra & text accompanying.
29
See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975) (refers to "an integrated
system of military courts and review procedures" and COMA's "thorough familiarity with
military problems"); Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 (1969) (COMA is the "court to which
Congress has provided primary responsibility for the supervision of military justice in this
country"); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (only in the absence of a "full and fair
consideration" by COMA would the Supreme Court review claims of denial of constitutional
due process).
S0E.g., Walker & Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals-Its History, Organization
and Operation, 6 VAND. L. REv. 228, 230 (1953). Judge Quinn, discussing COMA's role, once
said, "It was contemplated... that the Court would function as the 'Supreme Court' of the
whole military justice system, which includes the summary court-martial which has no power
to impose a sentence of the kind subject to review by the Court of Military Appeals, and that
the decisions of the Court would be applied in all courts-martial." Quinn, The United States
Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 225, 225 (1961)
(citation omitted). See Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin,
Operation and Future,55 MiL L. RFV. 39, 71(1972). COMA has in several instances also
referred to its position in the military justice system. Courmey v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 88'
n.2, 51 C.M.R. 260, 261 n.2 (1976), quoting Gale v. United States, 17 C.M.A. 40, 43, 37 C.M.R.
304, 307 (1967) (COMA is "supreme civilian court" in the armed forces); United States v.
Ambruster, 11 C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412, 414 (1960). Former Chief Justice Warren
believed that the "establishment of a special court to review [due process) cases obviates, at
least to some extent, the objection of lack of familiarity by the reviewing tribunal with the
special problems of the military." Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 181, 190 (1962) (citation omitted).
31Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1976).
32
See note 3 supra; Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43-44 (1976):
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Modification of Alderman: Collateral Effects of
Summary Court-Martial Convictions
COMA's second option is to restrict the use at a subsequent trial of
summary court-martial convictions obtained without counsel. Alderman
held that the use at a later trial of counsel-less summary court convictions
where confinement had been imposed was prohibited because Argersinger
v. Hamlin33 mandated the prohibition.34 After Middendorf, that rationale is
gone and in its place is the holding that summary courts-martial are not
criminal prosecutions.3 5 COMA must now examine the Manual for CourtsMartial in three important areas to determine whether its provisions
comport with that holding.
Congress, in drafting the Uniform Code of Military Justice,3 6 the
promulgators of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 37 COMA38 and commentators in the field of military law 39 had always assumed that summary courtsmartial, as part of the court-martial system, were criminal in nature.
Convictions obtained at summary courts-martial are used in the military to
escalate punishment, aggravate sentences at subsequent courts-martial and
impeach witnesses. If summary court-martial convictions are not criminal,
then their use in these situations must be questioned.4 0
Article 19, UCMJ, provides that a bad-conduct discharge may not be
adjudged unless the accused was represented by counsel. Yet the escalator
clause of the Manual for Courts-Martial 4' thwarts this congressional intent
by permitting the use of counsel-less summary court-martial convictions to
33407 U.S. 25 (1972) (sentence to imprisonment for even a brief period of time without
representation
by counsel invalid).
34
See note -3 supra.
35
See note 2 supra.
36
UCMJ art. 36(a), 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1970), which provides for executive promulgation
of the Manual for Courts-Martial, also provides, without distinguishing among courtsmartial, that the regulations shall "apply the principles of law and rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in United States district courts .... " Cf. UCMJ art. 31
(self-incrimination), art. 44 (former jeopardy) and art. 45 (guilty pleas), 10 U.S.C. §§ 831, 844,
845 (1970).
7
3 MCM
79a, 1969 (rev.), provides that "the procedure prescribed for a general courtmartial will, when applicable, serve as a guide for a summary court-martial." MCM
115a
provides for process to compel testimony of witnesses and production of evidence "similar to
that which courts of the United States having criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue." See
also MCM
137 (evidence), 1 128b (degree of criminality of summary court-martial offenses).
' 8"[C]ourts-martial are criminal prosecutions .. " United States v. Crawford, 15 C.M.A.
31, 32, 35 C.M.R. 3, 6 (1964). All three judges in the Alderman case mentioned the criminal
nature of summary courts-martial. 22 C.M.A. at 300, 304, 309 n.1, 46 C.M.R. at 300, 304, 309
n.1. In addition, government counsel at oral argument for Middendorf said, "[W]e don't deny
that this is a criminal proceeding." Oral argument before the Supreme Court 29, Middendorf
v. Henry, Nos. 74-175, 74-5176, Jan. 22, 1975.
39E.g., Sherman, CongressionalProposalsfor Reform of Military Law, 10 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 25, 28 (1971); UNITED STATES TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUsTICE
IN THE ARMED FORCES, 74-75 (1972).
40
See notes 36-39 supra.
41
MCM 1 127c, 1969 (rev.). See note 4 supra.
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trigger a bad-conduct discharge for an accused at a subsequent special
court-martial.4 2 Thus, such a discharge may be based on counsel-less
adjudications of guilt at what are now deemed noncriminal proceedings. In
effect, the counsel-less summary court-martial is a critical stage4 3 in the
sequence of proceedings leading to a bad-conduct discharge which a special
court-martial could not otherwise have imposed. Since Congress in all
probability considered summary courts-martial to be criminal" but did not,
before Argersinger, consider the issue of counsel at such courts,4 the Court
of Military Appeals should exercise its supervisory authority over the
Manual for Courts-Martial4 6 to void its escalator clause.47
Even if summary court-martial convictions are not used to escalate the
maximum sentence at special courts-martial, they still may be introduced
8
as matters in aggravation of sentence at a subsequent court-martial.
9
Although the accused's record of nonjudicial punishment may also be
42

1t has been suggested that summary courts-martial "are often convened with a specific
purpose of using the conviction to escalate punishment at subsequent prosecutions of the
same accused." Fidell, The Summary Court-Martial:A Proposal,8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 571, 585
(1971) (citation omitted).
43COMA has recognized a right to counsel at the critical stage, for example, of
questioning a suspect at a preliminary investigation. United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629,
37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). That is not the argument here; rather, the point is that since a summary
court-martial is a critical stage to a later bad-conduct discharge, and since there is no right to
counsel at the summary court, its use for this subsequent purpose is impermissible.
44See note 36 supra.
45The Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1135, amended UCMJ
art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970). It also extended to accused the right to legally-trained counsel
at special courts-martial. UCMJ art. 27(b), 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) (1970). No mention was made
of summary courts-martial, but this law was passed four years before the decision in
Argersinger, and Congress probably did not give any attention to the issue of confinement.
"COMA has in the past voided provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial which it
found to be in conflict with provisions of the UCMJ or the Constitution. See Willis, The
United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 MIL. L. REV.
84-85 & nn. 249-52 (1972). In United States v. Douglas, 24 C.M.A. 178, 51 C.M.R. 397 (1976),
COMA held that its interpretation of the UCMJ is controlling when an MCM provision is in
question. COMA recently found that MCM
67f, 1969 (rev.), which provided that a military
judge would accede to a convening authority's view of a pre-trial dismissal, was in direct
conflict with UCMJ art. 62(a), 10 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1970), and congressional intent. United
States v. Ware, 24 C.M.A. 102, 51 C.M.R. 275 (1976). See also United States v. Ward, 23 C.M.A.
391, 394, 50 C.M.R. 273, 276 (1975) (UCMJ art. 10, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1970), speedy trial
provision is a "command of Congress" and controls MCM
31g, 1969 (rev.), provision for
joinder of offenses, which is "only a statement of policy"); United States v. Landry, 14 C.M.A.
553, 34 C.M.R. 333 (1964) (improper limitation of sentencing power of court-martial); United
States v. Rhinehart, 9 C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957) (court members not allowed to use
MCM during trial); United States v. Jenkins, 7 C.M.A. 261, 22 C.M.R. 51 (1956) (UCMJ art.
83, 10 U.S.C. § 883 (1970), "fraudulent enlistment" did not include inductions as stated in the
Manual).
47In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), the Supreme Court invalidated a conviction
obtained under a recidivist statute where the contributing prior conviction was obtained in
violation of the right to counsel for indigents required by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
4SMCM
75b, 1969 (rev.).
49
UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970), allows a commander to impose punishment for
minor offenses without court-martial. At most, a commander at an article 15 proceeding,
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introduced at sentencing, it must be remembered that the court members
sentence, 50 not the military judge. 51 With the introduction of a prior
summary court-martial conviction, the court members are receiving not
background information on the accused, but an adjudication of guilt.
Accustomed as most people are to regarding all court-martial convictions
as criminal, 52 members may give undue weight to a noncriminal conviction
at a summary court. At the very least, COMA should require a limiting
instruction to remind members at sentencing that the adjudication of guilt
from a summary court-martial was obtained at a noncriminal proceeding,
and without the benefit of counsel. A better solution would be to prohibit
altogether the use of prior convictions at summary courts-martial for
53
sentencing purposes.
The use of summary court-martial convictions at a later trial as
evidence to impeach the accused must also be examined.54 Such convictions
do indeed "carry a stamp of 'bad character' -51 with them that could
influence a court to convict. Since summary courts-martial are appropriate
only for "minor offenses,"'5 6 it is difficult to justify their use for impeachment purposes as proving moral turpitude or lack of credibility.5 7 In a
recent case, COMA discussed the general guideline for an offense involving
which is regarded as a disciplinary tool, can give thirty days' correctional custody. It has been
compared to detention after school in terms of community attitude toward it. United States v.
Shamel, 22 C.M.A. 361, 362, 47 C.M.R. 116, 117 (1973). COMA has also observed that "an
Article 15 punishment is not a conviction." United States v. Johnson, 19 C.M.A. 464, 467, 42
C.M.R. 66, 69 (1970). See Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 MIL. L. REv. 37 (1965).
50MCM
75d, 1969 (rev.).
-1 MCM
76b, 1969 (rev.). Thus, sentencing is done by persons who lack judicial
experience, have no background report on the accused on which to base a judgment, and must
make their decision on the basis of what they hear in court. This situation is exacerbated by
the fact that the responsibility f6r presenting matters in extenuation and mitigation rests with
the accused,
not with the judge or an associated agency. MCM
75c, 1969 (rev.).
52
See notes 36-39 supra.
53
See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), in which the Court held that a
conviction rendered in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), could not be
used in a later proceeding to increase punishment. The counsel-less adjudication of guilt at a
summary court-martial handicaps the accused at his new trial by stigmatizing him in the eyes
of the sentencing members and therefore becomes an integral part of the trial. In contrast,
nonjudicial punishments do not carry nearly the prejudicial weight court-martial convictions
do. See4 note 49 supra.
5 MCM f 1 138g, 149b, 153b(2) (b), 1969 (rev.). See note 55 infra.
S5 Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 39 (1976). The Supreme Court, conjecturing
that a conviction for a military offense would have "no consequences for the accused beyond
the immediate punishment," id., evidently was not aware of its use at trial. The Court may
also have assumed that the MCM was similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence; there are
significant differences. Compare MCM
1 1138g, 149b(1), 153b(2), 1969 (rev.), with FED. R.
EvID. 404, 608(b), 609. Under MCM f 153b there is no requirement that the judge weigh
prejudice to accused for moral turpitude offenses; there is such a requirement in FED. R. Evw.
609(a) 56(1).
MCM
1 79a, 1969 (rev.).
57
COMA has recognized the conceptual problem of using convictions for "minor"
offenses to impeach when they must at the same time involve "moral turpitude" or affect
"credibility" under MCM 1153b(2) (b), 1969 (rev.). See United States v. Moore, 5 C.M.A. 687,
697-98, 18 C.M.R. 311, 321-22 (1955).
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moral turpitude which would exclude in most cases both convictions at
summary and special courts-martial as evidence of a prior offense. 58
However, the case involved the use of a nonjudicial punishment to
impeach a witness who was not the accused. Left open was the question
whether a summary court conviction could be used to impeach credibility 59
or as evidence of misconduct under MCM
138g. 60 In light of the minor
nature of the offenses for which summary courts are convened and of the
weight a court-martial conviction carries with members of a court, 6' COMA
should set a standard for the use of summary court-martial convictions for
impeaching credibility to replace the present vague standard. 62 The most
easily administered standard, and one which avoids any possibility of
prejudice to the accused, is one of total exclusion of the use of summary
court-martial convictions to impeach credibility. 63
Expanding Alderman:
Extension of the Right to "Counselat Summary Courts-Martial
Early in its existence, COMA took a position of judicial activism 64 to
oversee basic rights in the military justice system. Although this activism
has been on the wane in recent years, 65 there are indications that COMA
58
United States v. Johnson, 23 C.M.A. 534, 535, 50 C.M.R. 705, 706 (1975). The guideline is
whether "the authorized punishment include[s] a dishonorable discharge or confinement at
hard labor for a year or more." This means the offense, not the type of court-martial which is
chosen, controls. It is a fair inference, however, than an offense which warrants a dishonorable
discharge or confinement for one year would not be tried at a summary court, whose
jurisdiction extends to not more than thirty days' confinement, or at a special court-martial,
whose jurisdictional limits are a bad-conduct discharge and six months' confinement.
591n United States v. Johnson, 23 C.M.A. 534, 50 C.M.R. 705 (1975), the court indicated
that in order to affect credibility, deceit or fraud must have been involved in the commission of
the offense, but it did not set out the offenses which fall into this category. See FED. R. EVID.
609(a) (Conference Report notes delineate offenses involving fraud or deceit).
6
0MCM
138g, 1969 (rev.), allows evidence of prior misconduct of an accused to prove
identity, knowledge, intent, consciousness of guilt or motive, or to rebut an inference of
accident, mistake or entrapment. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
61
See notes 48-53 supra & text accompanying.
62
See note 59 supra.
6
3Cf. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
64
See Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the
Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 568 (1974); Willis, The Constitution, the United States Court of
Military Appeals and the Future, 57 MIL. L. REv. 27 (1972); Sherman, The Civilianizationof
Military Law, 22 MAINE L. Rav. 3, 51 (1970) (COMA has "accomplished more reform in the
field of procedural due process than all the prior congressional codes put together.").
65
Willis, supra note 46, at 96-97. See also United States v. Snyder, 18 C.M.A. 480, 40
C.M.R. 192 (1969), where COMA retreated from its prior stand on jurisdiction to hold that it
would not take action under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), unless in aid of
jurisdiction or where it would eventually have jurisdiction under UCMJ arts. 66 and 67, 10
U.S.C. §§ 866, 867 (1970).
Snyder was applied to summary courts-martial in Thomas v. United States, 19 C.M.A.
639 (1969). However, in a recent case COMA reasserted the exercise of its supervisory
authority and noted that Snyder was "too narrowly focused." McPhail v. United States, 24
C.M.A. 304, 310, 52 C.M.R. 15, 21 (1976).
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may be willing to provide a strong sense of direction for the military justice
66
system once again.
As part of its role as the general supervisory authority for the military
justice system, COMA could choose the third alternative: to expand
Alderman and extend the right to counsel to accused at all summary courtsmartial 67 as a mandate of military due process. Military due process has
been described as "representing the various procedural and substantive
rights of a military accused," 68 and COMA frequently has extended
protections in its name.6 9 Closely connected with the concept of military
due process is the idea that COMA may exercise "inherent powers" 70 in
addition to its statutory powers under Article 67.71
"6See Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 88 n.2, 51 C.M.R. 260, 261 n.2 (1976), where
the court said that "Article 67, Uniform Code of Military Justice... does not describe the full
panoply of -[COMA's] powers" and held that decisions whether to impose pretrial confinement must be made by an independent magistrate. See also United States v. Cruz-Rijos, 24
C.M.A. 271, 51 C.M.R. 723 (1976); United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 24 C.M.A. 1, 51 C.M.R. 1
(1975); Note, Building a System of Military Justice Through the All Writs Act, 52 IND. L.J.
(1976), supra. In addition, COMA seems to be making a concerted effort to introduce
ABA Standards and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility into its opinions. See note
89 infra. Cf. Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: "Born Again," 52 IND. L.J.
(1976),
supra.
67
Free of the "confinement" rationale it followed in Alderman, see note 3 supra, COMA
could recognize a right to counsel at all summary courts-martial, as it previously felt it could
not. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 22 C.M.A. 325, 46 C.M.R. 325 (1973) (summary courtmartial where confinement not imposed could be used in aggravation of sentence); accord,
United States v. Peters, 22 C.M.A. 348, 46 C.M.R. 348 (1973).
6sWillis, The United States Court of Military Appeals, Its Origin, Operation and Future,
55 MIL. L. REv. 39, 81 n.226 (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMA: Origin, Operation and
Future]. See Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process,
35 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 225, 232 (1967). The concept of military due process was first set out in
United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951) and qualified in United States v.
Sutton, 3 C.M.A. 220, 11 C.M.R. 220 (1953). See Wurfel, "Military Due Process": What Is It?,
6 VAND. L. REv. 251 (1953); COMA: Origin, Operation and Future, supra at 79-83, for an
account of the development of military due process. This doctrine has fallen into desuetude
following the Tempia-Jacoby line of cases. See note 74 infra.
69See COMA: Origin, Operation and Future, supra note 68, at 79-83.
70Id. at 87, 83-89. COMA has recognized that "[plart of [its] responsibility includes the
protection and preservation of the Constitutional rights of persons in the armed forces."
United States v. Frischholz, 16 C.M.A. 150, 152, 36 C.M.R. 306, 308 (1966). COMA has also
recognized its "general supervisory power over the administration of military justice." Gale v.
United States, 17 C.M.A. 40, 42, 37 C.M.R. 304, 306 (1967). See also United States v. Clay, I
C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951) (duty to see court-martial conducted fairly); United States v.
O'Neal, 1 C.M.A. 138, 2 C.M.R. 44 (1952) (authority to regulate law officer and court
members); United States v. Drexler, 9 C.M.A. 405, 26 C.M.R. 185 (1958) (duty to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to preserve integrity of court-martial). It would seem that the
"inherent
powers" are not necessarily limited to the protection of constitutional rights.
71
UCMJ art. 67(b), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (1970). See note 11 supra. COMA's statutory
review extends to all cases which involve either a death sentence or a general or flag officer;
cases from the Courts of Military Review which the Judge Advocate General sends to COMA
for review; and cases on petition of the accused from the Court of Military Review in which
COMA grants review. UCMJ art. 66(b), 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1970), restricts Court of Military
Review jurisdiction to cases involving a death sentence or a general or flag officer; dismissal of
a commissioned officer, cadet or midshipman; dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or
confinement for one year or more.
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The Court of Military Appeals has often held that military due process
or congressional intent, 72 as expressed in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, required a more stringent protection of rights than the Supreme
Court had theretofore recognized.73 It has also followed the Supreme
Court's interpretation of constitutional rights.7 4 At the forefront of these
cases has been the expansion of the right to counsel.7
It is somewhat anomalous for an accused, who is afforded the benefit of
counsel at an interrogation or a pretrial lineup, to have no right to counsel
if he is subsequently referred to a summary court-martial. 76 From the
preliminary investigation through the entire court-martial process, the
accused enjoys the benefits of legal counsel unless he happens to be tried at
a summary court.7 7 In addition, the difficulties an accused faces in
preparing his own defense before a summary court are increased where he
is in confinement: he is able neither to obtain advice easily from the staff

72

Since military due process is also supposed to be based on congressional intent, it is
often difficult to tell when military due process stands alone. United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.A.
74, 77,73 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951).
E.g., COMA held that the harmless error rule does not apply where a person is
impeached with a statement taken after warnings under UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970),
but without advice as to right to counsel. United States v. Hall, 23 C.M.A. 549, 50 C.M.R. 720
(1975). This holding goes beyond Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 22 (1971) and Milton v.
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); accord, United States v. Girard, 23 C.M.A. 263, 49 C.M.R.
438 (1975); United States v. Jordan, 20 C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971). See Armstrong, The
Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: The Military's Options in the Wake of
Jordan and Harris, 26 JAG J. 1 (1971).
COMA set a ninety-day speedy trial rule in United States v. Burton, 21 C.M.A. 112, 44
*C.M.R. 166 (1971) and United States v.Driver, 23 C.M.A. 243, 49 C.M.R. 376 (1974), whereas
the Supreme Court had said that it was not possible to set a time limit for speedy trial in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
COMA, also announced, in United States v. Tomazewski, 8 C.M.A. 266, 24 C.M.R. 76
(1957), a right to counsel at the Article 32 preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court did not
recognize a similar civilian right until Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
In United States v. Greer, 3 C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953), COMA held that an
accused cannot be forced to provide a voice exemplar. This exceeded what was then required
under the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
74
E.g., Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976); United States v.
Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973); United States v. Greene, 21 C.M.A. 543, 45
C M.R. 317 (1972); United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United
States v. Jacoby, I1 C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960). These cases all followed an expansion of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional rights. It remains to be seen whether
COMA will act in the face of a Supreme Court decision specifically restricting a right.
75See notes 73 and 74 supra; United States v. Dohle, 24 C.M.A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975);
United States v. Brady, 8 C.M.A. 456, 24 C.M.R. 266 (1957).
76See Fidell, The Summary Court-Martial: A Proposal, 8 HARV. J. LEGIs. 571, 586
.(1971).
Even a person who may receive nonjudicial punishment under DCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C.
§ 815 (1970), has a right to consult with counsel and is allowed to have a person speak in his
behalf. Para. 3-12a, b, Army Reg. 27-10, Change 16 (4 Nov. 75), interpreting MCM 132, 1969
(rev.).
77This also means that an attorney-client relationship established during the pretrial
stages may be broken when an accused is brought to trial at a summary court. Military courts
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judge advocate's office nor to gather evidence in mitigation.78 Although it
has been claimed that counsel at summary courts-martial would unduly
lengthen a proceeding 79 designed to "exercise justice promptly,"80 the time
taken to complete summary courts before Alderman indicates that they
were not in actuality summary proceedings.8
Finally, there is a two-pronged equal protection argument to be made
for requiring counsel at all summary courts-martial.8 2 First, an accused at
a summary court-martial has always been allowed to retain civilian counsel
at his own expense. 83 Persons who are indigent will be in an unfairly
disadvantaged position.8 4 Second, a summary court-martial can award
confinement only to persons holding the rank of E-4 or below. 85 Persons of
the rank of E-5 and above may be sentenced to confinement only at a
special or general court-martial where full constitutional protections are
have frowned on any interference with the attorney-client relationship. E.g., United States v.
McOmber, 24 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976); United States v. Otterbeck, 50 C.M.R. 7
(NCMR
1974).
78
"Most accused persons, who are scheduled to appear before special and summary
courts-martial, seem to be confined before trial, as a matter of course." Lermack, Summary
and Special Courts-Martial. An EmpiricalInvestigation, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 329, 351 (1974).
For a discussion of the problems an accused before a summary court faces and of the pressures
on the79summary court officer, see id. at 354-55.
The Supreme Court, in Middendorf, believed that the "presence of counsel will turn a
brief, informal hearing which may be quickly convened and rapidly concluded into an
attenuated proceeding which consumes the resources of the military ...." 425 U.S. at 45. As
previously noted, the right to refuse trial by summary court-martial negates in large part the
objection to the consumption of resources. See note 7 supra. Only dropping the charges
altogether would conserve resources.
80
MCM IT79a, 1969 (rev.).
81
An everage of 33!4 days for summary court-martial without counsel was quoted in oral
Oral argument before the Supreme Court 44,
argument before the Supreme Court.
Middendorf v. Henry, Nos. 74-175, 74-5176, Jan. 22, 1975. In addition, the government offered
nothing "to indicate that the average time of the summary court-martial proceeding itself has
been lengthened as a result of providing counsel to defendants." Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. at 64-65 n.16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82This is not necessarily a constitutional right. COMA has recognized, however, that
"even though the Fifth Amendment contains no express equal protection clause, the principle
long has been applied via the Fifth Amendment's language which forbids discrimination
which is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' " United States v. Courtney, 24
C.M.A. 280, 281 n.3, 51 C.M.R. 796, 797 n.3 (1976) (charging marijuana possession offense
under art. 134 rather than art. 96 as denial of equal protection). COMA could apply this same
analysis to the military due process concept in order to protect the integrity of the courtmartial system and to inspire confidence among members of the armed forces in the fairness of
the system.
83
See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 65 & n.17 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358, 366 (9th Cir. 1974); Lermack, supra note 78, at 373; Army
Regulation 27-10, Change 12 (12 Dec 73), para. 2-12 governs the qualifications of civilian
counsel84 at courts-martial and makes no exception for the summary court.
1t has been said that "under the system of military justice, the concept of indigency is
of no real relevancy." United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 306, 46 C.M.R. 298, 306
(1972) (Duncan, J., concurring and dissenting). It is relevant, however, where some accused
can afford to retain civilian counsel while others cannot, a situation analogous to Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8MCM
16b, 1969 (rev.).
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afforded. 6 Thus, only one segment of the enlisted population 7 is subject
to confinement without the assistance of counsel. Therefore, military due
process should require that the right to counsel be extended to all summary
courts-martial."
Two other policies militate in favor of action by COMA in the area of
the right to counsel. One is COMA's continuing concern for the integrity
and impartiality of court-martial procedures,8 9 particularly in cases of one
counsel representing joint accused.90 The other is the maintenance and
improvement of morale among members of the armed forces and of
increased public confidence in military justice.9 1 Counsel at summary
courts-martial would further both goals.
ALTERNATIVE CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTIONS

If the Court of Military Appeals chooses not to act decisively in the
Redmond case, there are several alternate solutions, all involving congresFirst is the abolition of the summary court-martial.
sional action.
Commentators have recommended this course of action for years, 92 and
86UCMJ arts. 26, 27(a), 28 and 29, 10 U.S.C. §§ 826, 827(a), 828 and 829 (1970). This may

partially explain why higher ranking NCOs are rarely brought to summary courts-martial.
See also Lermack, Summary and Special Courts-Martial: An Empirical Investigation, 18 ST.
Louis87U.L.J. 329, 345 (1974).

Officers are not subject to summary courts-martial. UCMJ art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820

(1970).

88
See Fidell, The Summary Court-Martial: A Proposal,8 HARV. J. LEGIs. 571, 585, 600
(1971). As one judge remarked, concerning the effect of the escalator clause: "I doubt... that

any offense can, abstractly, be described as minor." United States v. Sharkey, 19 C.M.A. 26, 28,
41 C.M.R. 26, 28 (1969) (concurring opinion).
891n addition to stressing that "the impression of partiality must not be created," United
States v. Clower, 23 C.M.A. 15, 18, 48 C.M.R. 307, 310 (1974), COMA has frequently
mentioned the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and various ABA Standards. E.g.,
United States v. Nelson, 24 C.M.A. 49, 51 C.M.R. 143 (1975); United States v. Beach, 23 C.M.A.
480, 50 C.M.R. 560 (1975); United States v. Wilkerson, 23 C.M.A. 440, 50 C.M.R. 459 (1975);
United States v. Kimble, 23 C.M.A. 251, 49 C.M.R. 384 (1974) (concurring opinion).
90MCM J48c, 1969 (rev.), provides that counsel for co-accused must inform them of
possible conflicts or disabilities which might warrant requesting other counsel. United Stdtes
v. Evans, 24 C.M.A. 14, 51 C.M.R. 64 (1975) contained the admonition that representation of
multiple accused is the exception to the preferred situation of each accused being represented
by his own individual defense attorney. In Evans, prejudice to defendant was found. Even
though no prejudice to a defendant with co-defendants was found in United States v. Blakey,
24 C.M.A. 63, 51 C.M.R. 192 (1976), the court reiterated its strong suggestion that
representation of multiple accused be avoided. Canon Five, ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, was cited in both cases.
91Lermack, supra note 86, at 373.
at 378; I UNITED STATES TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUsTICE
FORCES, 76, 122 (1972); Fidell, supra note 88, at 572; Bayh, The Military Justice
Act of 1971: The Need for Legislative Reform, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 9 (1971); Hatfield, Civil
Safeguards for the Military, 7-8 TRIAL 43 (1971); Sherman, Congressional Proposals for
Reform of Military Law, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 25 (1971); Ervin, The Military JusticeAct of
1968, 45 MIL L. REv. 77 (1968). But see Staring, The Role of the Commander, 61 A.B.A.J.
921d.
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several bills have been proposed that would do away with summary
courts.93 Nonjudicial punishment under UCMJ Article 1591 could fill in
the gap easily. 95 Another solution is congressional grant of counsel at
summary courts-martial. The last major amendment to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice was in 1968,96 four years before the decision in
Argersinger. After the decision in Middendorf, Congress may want to
change its mind. A third possibility is a grant to COMA of discretionary
review of major questions in all courts-martial. This would resolve the
awkwardness which COMA has experienced in extending its jurisdiction
under the All Writs Act.9 7 Finally, direct review of Court of Military
Appeals decisions in the Supreme Court could be created. 98 This would
avoid the inefficiency and delay of collateral habeas corpus attacks in the
federal courts. 99
In conclusion, COMA should take charge, continue its early trend of
activism and grant a right to counsel at all summary courts-martial. If it
chooses not to do so, it should at least void the now anomalous collateral
effects of certain provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial and strongly
suggest to Congress that changes be made. Such actions and suggestions
might finally spur Congress to act on the proposals that have been
languishing for years. It might also clarify the relationship of COMA, as
part of the federal court system, to the Supreme Court. As it now stands,
there is no review of COMA decisions in the Supreme Court, but each court

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 12

(1972).
93S.987, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973 Bayh); H.R. 291, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973 Bennett);
S.2171-2183, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971 Hatfield). Legislative history indicates that the
summary court-martial survived in 1968 only because of compromise. See Fidell, The
Summary Court-Martial. A Proposal, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 571, 574 (1974).
9410 U.S.C. § 815 (1970). See note 49 supra.
95
TASH FORCE, supra note 92, at 75; Fidell, supra note 93, at 572; Lermack, Summary and
Special Courts-Martial: An Empirical Investigation, 18 ST. LOUIS U.L. REv. 329, 378 (1974).
See Oral argument before the Supreme Court 40, Mid-dendorf v. Henry, Nos. -74-175, 74-5176.
Jan. 22, 1975.
96Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-B32, 82 Stat. 1i3 (1968).
9728 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970). See notes 65, 70 & 71 supra. COMA has been undecided as
to the ground of its jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, limiting itself to statutory
jurisdiction in some cases, while referring to inherent powers not contained in UCMJ art. 67,
10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970), in others.
98
See Bishop, The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215, 223 (1973); Willis, The
Constitution, the United States Court of Military Appeals and the Future,57 MIL. L. REV. 27,
84-85 (1972). The Supreme Court's lack of expertise in military law would present a serious
problem, however. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra. The Supreme Court could
formulate a policy of deference in most cases to COMA's interpretation of military necessity.
Cf. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43-44 (1976).
9On oral reargument, government counsel conceded that but for the fortuity of a sailor
going to federal court, the decision of COMA in Alderman could not have been brought before
the Supreme Court for review. Oral reargument before the Supreme Court 45, Middendorf v.
Henry, Nos. 74-175, 74-5176, Nov. 5, 1975.
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gives great deference to the other. The unresolved question is whether
COMA can ignore a Supreme Court decision, or, in an extreme case, reach
a contrary result. 00
PATRICIA A. DALY

10"See Kaplan v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971), where the
Supreme Court of California retained a rule on standing to challenge an unlawful search and
seizure despite a United States Supreme Court decision to the contrary. COMA, as-part of the
federal court system, is in a somewhat different position.

